The History, Structure, and Growing Crisis of a Court System Controlled by the Executive Branch

By Richard T. Herman, Esq.

Key Takeaways

• Immigration courts are not part of the federal judiciary.
• Immigration judges are employees of the U.S. Department of Justice.
• The Attorney General exercises supervisory authority over immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
• More than 3.2 million cases are currently pending before the immigration courts, the largest backlog in American history. (Trace Reports)
• EOIR’s FY 2027 budget request approaches $899 million, yet delays continue to grow. (Department of Justice)
• Critics across the political spectrum argue that immigration courts should be converted into independent Article I courts similar to the U.S. Tax Court.
• Federal judges—unlike immigration judges—do not work for the President, the Department of Justice, or the Attorney General.

Introduction

Every day, America’s immigration courts make decisions that can permanently alter lives.

They determine:

• whether an asylum seeker receives protection;
• whether a lawful permanent resident is deported;
• whether a family remains together;
• whether a child may remain safely in the United States;
• whether a long-time resident loses everything and is removed from the country.

These decisions are among the most important made anywhere in the American legal system.

Yet most Americans do not realize a startling fact:

Immigration courts are not actually independent courts.

Unlike federal district courts, federal courts of appeals, or the United States Supreme Court, immigration courts operate inside the executive branch of government.

The judges who preside over removal proceedings are employees of the same branch of government responsible for enforcing immigration laws.

That reality has generated criticism for decades from:

• immigration judges;
• former Board of Immigration Appeals members;
• the American Bar Association;
• the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA);
• academics;
• federal judges;
• members of Congress from both political parties.

The concern is not necessarily that individual immigration judges are biased.

The concern is structural.

The concern is whether a court system can truly be independent when it remains under the authority of the same executive branch that prosecutes the cases before it.

As immigration court backlogs exceed 3.2 million pending cases and hearings are now being scheduled years into the future, that debate has become impossible to ignore. (Trace Reports)

An independent judiciary could prioritize fairness over speed and enforcement.

What Most Americans Think Immigration Courts Are

Ask most Americans what an immigration judge is.

The answer is usually something like:

“A federal judge who decides immigration cases.”

That answer sounds reasonable.

It is also wrong.

Immigration judges are not Article III federal judges.

They are not members of the Judicial Branch.

They do not sit within the federal judiciary established by Article III of the Constitution.

Instead, immigration judges work for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a component of the U.S. Department of Justice. (Department of Justice)

That means immigration judges ultimately work within the same executive branch headed by the President of the United States.

Who Controls Immigration Courts?

The chain of authority is surprisingly direct.

At the top sits the President.

The President appoints the Attorney General.

The Attorney General oversees the Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice oversees EOIR.

EOIR oversees:

• immigration courts;
• immigration judges;
• the Board of Immigration Appeals;
• court administration;
• case management systems;
• court budgets.

The Attorney General also retains authority to certify selected immigration cases to himself or herself and issue binding precedent decisions that immigration judges nationwide must follow. (Department of Justice)

No federal district judge answers to the Attorney General.

No federal appellate judge answers to the Attorney General.

Yet immigration judges do.

That difference lies at the heart of the independence debate.

Why This Structure Is Unusual

Imagine a criminal court where:

• prosecutors worked for the Attorney General;
• trial judges worked for the Attorney General;
• appellate judges worked for the Attorney General;
• court administrators worked for the Attorney General.

Most Americans would immediately recognize a problem.

Courts derive legitimacy from independence.

The public generally accepts unfavorable rulings when they believe the judge was independent.

That principle is one of the cornerstones of the American legal system.

Immigration courts operate differently.

While DHS prosecutors and DOJ judges work in different agencies, they remain part of the same executive branch.

The appearance of independence is therefore weaker than in virtually every other major court system in the United States. The American Immigration Council argues that immigration courts’ structure creates a conflict of interest.

A Historical Accident, Not a Deliberate Design

One of the most important facts about immigration courts is that they were never intentionally designed to function as an independent judiciary.

The current structure evolved gradually.

Before 1940

Immigration decisions were largely administrative.

The federal government viewed immigration primarily as:

• border management;
• labor regulation;
• sovereignty protection.

Administrative officials—not judges—made most decisions.

1940

Immigration functions were transferred to the Department of Justice.

The logic seemed straightforward.

Immigration enforcement was viewed as a law enforcement issue.

The adjudication system followed.

1952 Immigration and Nationality Act

The INA largely formalized existing procedures.

Special Inquiry Officers, the predecessors of modern immigration judges, continued operating inside the executive branch.

1983 Creation of EOIR

The Department of Justice established EOIR in an effort to separate adjudication from immigration enforcement functions.

The reform improved administration.

But it did not create judicial independence.

The courts remained inside DOJ.

The judges remained DOJ employees.

The Attorney General remained the final authority. (Department of Justice)

Many scholars have described EOIR as a partial solution that addressed administrative concerns without solving the underlying independence problem.

Immigration Judges Are Not Federal Judges

This distinction matters.

Federal district judges enjoy protections designed to insulate them from politics.

Those protections include:

• life tenure;
• salary protection;
• constitutional independence;
• separation from executive branch control.

Immigration judges receive none of these protections.

They are career executive branch employees.

They operate within an agency budget.

They are subject to agency policies.

Their courts can be reorganized by executive officials.

The rules governing their work can change dramatically from one administration to the next.

This does not mean immigration judges lack integrity.

Most immigration judges are dedicated public servants attempting to apply complex laws under extraordinary workloads.

The issue is institutional design.

Not personal character.

Why Independence Matters

The importance of judicial independence becomes clearer when comparing immigration courts to federal district courts.

Federal judges are appointed by presidents.

Many current federal judges were appointed by President Trump.

Many others were appointed by Presidents Biden, Obama, Bush, and Clinton.

But once confirmed, they do not work for those presidents.

A Trump-appointed federal judge does not answer to Donald Trump.

A Biden-appointed judge did not answer to Joe Biden.

Federal judges regularly rule against the administrations that appointed them.

That is precisely what judicial independence is supposed to accomplish.

Over the past several years, federal district judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic presidents have issued thousands of decisions involving:

• immigration detention;
• habeas corpus petitions;
• asylum restrictions;
• expedited removal procedures;
• parole policies;
• travel restrictions;
• TPS litigation;
• deportation practices.

Sometimes the government wins.

Sometimes the government loses.

But the legitimacy of those decisions rests largely on the independence of the decision-maker.

Immigration courts lack many of those same structural safeguards.

The Crisis Has Reached Historic Levels

The debate over court independence might once have seemed theoretical.

Today it is not.

The immigration court system is facing unprecedented strain.

According to TRAC’s April 2026 data:

• 3,267,302 active cases were pending before the immigration courts;
• more than 2.3 million asylum seekers were awaiting hearings or decisions;
• hearings are now being scheduled years into the future. (Trace Reports)

At the same time, the Department of Justice is requesting approximately $899 million for EOIR in FY 2027, reflecting continued efforts to expand court operations and address the backlog. (Department of Justice)

Yet despite increased spending, increased hiring, expanded court facilities, and technological modernization, the backlog remains measured in the millions. (Trace Reports)

The obvious question is no longer whether more judges are needed.

The question is whether the structure itself has become part of the problem.

The American Immigration Lawyers Association advocates for an independent immigration court system. Proponents argue that independent immigration courts would reduce political interference.

The Independence Problem: How Politics, Attorney General Control, and Executive Branch Oversight Shape America’s Immigration Courts

Key Takeaways

• Immigration courts remain under the authority of the U.S. Department of Justice.
• The Attorney General possesses powers over immigration courts that have no equivalent in the federal judiciary.
• Presidential administrations regularly reshape immigration court policies through executive branch leadership changes.
• Both Republican and Democratic administrations have used Attorney General review authority to influence immigration law.
• Federal judges are institutionally independent; immigration judges are not.
• Critics argue that the current structure undermines consistency, public confidence, and due process.
• Supporters of reform advocate converting EOIR into an independent Article I court similar to the U.S. Tax Court.

Why Judicial Independence Matters

The principle of judicial independence is one of the oldest foundations of American democracy.

The concept is simple:

Courts should decide cases based on law and facts, not political priorities.

That principle is why federal judges enjoy protections designed to shield them from political pressure.

Federal district judges:

• do not work for the President;
• do not report to Cabinet officials;
• cannot be removed because politicians dislike their decisions;
• cannot have their salaries reduced;
• cannot be reassigned because they rule against the government.

The purpose of those protections is not to benefit judges.

The purpose is to protect litigants.

People are more likely to accept an unfavorable ruling when they believe the judge was independent.

That legitimacy is essential to the rule of law.

Proponents argue that independent immigration courts would reduce political interference.

Immigration Courts Operate Under a Different Model

Immigration courts were never granted those protections.

Instead, they remain housed within the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a component of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Official EOIR information is available through the DOJ’s EOIR website:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir

Unlike federal judges, immigration judges are employees of the executive branch.

They serve within an agency overseen by political appointees.

The Attorney General ultimately controls the immigration court system.

This distinction lies at the center of the independence debate.

The Attorney General’s Extraordinary Power

No feature of immigration court structure better illustrates the independence problem than Attorney General certification authority.

Under federal regulations, the Attorney General may direct that a case be referred for review.

After review, the Attorney General may issue a precedential decision binding on:

• every immigration judge;
• every BIA member;
• every immigration court nationwide.

Government source:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir

This authority has repeatedly been used by administrations of both political parties.

Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the Attorney General is not a neutral judicial officer.

The Attorney General is:

• the nation’s chief law enforcement officer;
• a member of the President’s Cabinet;
• a political appointee;
• an executive branch official.

In effect, a political appointee may establish nationwide immigration court precedent.

Few democracies permit this degree of executive control over adjudication.

Imagine This Happening in Federal Court

Suppose the Attorney General announced:

“I disagree with how federal judges are handling asylum claims, detention cases, or constitutional challenges. Therefore, I will personally rewrite the legal standards and issue binding precedent.”

That would be impossible.

The Attorney General has no authority over federal district courts.

No authority over federal courts of appeals.

No authority over the Supreme Court.

Yet in immigration courts, Attorney General precedent decisions remain one of the most powerful forces shaping immigration law.

That reality is one reason organizations such as the American Bar Association and AILA have repeatedly supported independent immigration court proposals.

Additional Reading

AILA Policy Brief:

https://www.aila.org/library/policy-brief-america-needs-independent-fair-and-efficient-immigration-courts

ABA Position:

Testimony in support of Article I immigration courts

Elections Can Reshape Immigration Courts

Another consequence of executive branch control is policy volatility.

Federal courts generally remain stable across administrations.

Immigration courts often do not.

When administrations change, immigration court policies frequently change with them.

Examples have included:

• administrative closure authority;
• continuance standards;
• asylum eligibility rules;
• prosecutorial discretion;
• detention policies;
• docket priorities;
• enforcement priorities;
• motions to reopen standards.

As a result, immigration practitioners often describe immigration law as one of the most politically unstable areas of American law.

The law itself may remain unchanged.

The interpretation and implementation of the law often changes dramatically.

The BIA and Executive Branch Influence

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) serves as the highest administrative immigration tribunal.

Official BIA information:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals

The Board’s decisions often determine:

• detention rights;
• asylum eligibility;
• cancellation of removal standards;
• reopening procedures;
• adjustment of status eligibility;
• removal defenses.

Because BIA members are appointed through executive branch processes, critics have long argued that Board composition may significantly affect immigration jurisprudence.

This concern is not unique to one administration.

It has existed under Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

The issue is structural.

The appellate body deciding immigration cases remains part of the same executive branch responsible for immigration enforcement.

The BIA’s backlog reached nearly 220,000 cases by 2025. The Board of Immigration Appeals has 15 members after recent cuts.

The Bond Jurisdiction Controversy

One recent example involves detention and bond jurisdiction.

Historically, many detained immigrants could request bond hearings before immigration judges.

Over the past several years, however, DHS and EOIR increasingly advanced interpretations that classified certain individuals as arriving applicants for admission under INA §235 rather than detainees under INA §236.

The practical consequence was significant.

If the individual fell within §235 detention authority, immigration judges frequently lacked authority to grant bond.

Release decisions instead became matters of DHS parole discretion.

Critics argue that this shift reduced access to neutral review and expanded executive detention authority.

Supporters contend the interpretation follows statutory text.

The broader point is this:

The immigration courts frequently adopted legal interpretations expanding detention authority while independent federal courts often subjected those same interpretations to constitutional scrutiny through habeas litigation.

The Courthouse Arrest Controversy

Another issue drawing national attention involves courthouse arrests.

In some jurisdictions, DHS moved to dismiss removal proceedings before an immigration judge.

After termination of proceedings, ICE officers allegedly arrested individuals near or outside the courtroom and initiated expedited removal procedures.

Critics argued that these practices transformed immigration courts into enforcement gateways.

Supporters argued that DHS simply exercised lawful enforcement authority.

Regardless of one’s position, the controversy highlights a recurring perception problem:

Many immigrants do not view immigration courts as independent from the enforcement agencies appearing before them.

Public confidence suffers when litigants perceive courts and prosecutors as operating within the same institutional structure.

Compare This to Federal Judges Hearing Immigration Cases

The contrast becomes most obvious in federal court.

Over the last several years, federal district judges have issued thousands of immigration-related decisions involving:

• detention;
• asylum restrictions;
• expedited removal;
• TPS;
• parole programs;
• travel bans;
• constitutional challenges;
• habeas corpus petitions.

Many of those judges were appointed by President Trump.

Many were appointed by Presidents Biden, Obama, Bush, and Clinton.

Yet their rulings often cut against the preferences of the administrations that appointed them.

Why?

Because they do not work for those administrations.

A Trump-appointed judge is not subordinate to Donald Trump.

A Biden-appointed judge was not subordinate to Joe Biden.

Their duty is to the Constitution and the law.

That institutional independence helps explain why federal courts remain trusted even when their decisions are controversial.

The Rise of Performance Metrics and Quotas

Another criticism involves immigration judge performance measures.

Several years ago, DOJ implemented case completion quotas and performance standards.

Supporters argued the backlog crisis required measurable productivity standards.

Critics responded that judges should not be evaluated like production workers.

Imagine:

• criminal judges receiving monthly conviction quotas;
• federal judges receiving dismissal targets;
• bankruptcy judges being graded on case completion numbers.

Most Americans would reject such metrics.

Yet immigration judges have operated under various forms of performance evaluation tied to case management goals.

The debate reflects a deeper tension:

Are immigration courts courts?

Or are they administrative agencies attempting to process large volumes of cases?

The answer remains unclear.

Why Former Immigration Judges Have Become Some of the Strongest Critics

Many of the most vocal supporters of independent immigration courts are former immigration judges themselves.

Organizations such as the National Association of Immigration Judges have repeatedly warned that executive branch control threatens:

• judicial independence;
• consistency;
• public confidence;
• due process.

Numerous retired judges have testified before Congress in favor of creating an Article I immigration court.

Their argument is not that immigration enforcement should stop.

Their argument is that adjudication should be separated from enforcement.

The Core Question

The debate ultimately comes down to a simple question:

Can a court truly be independent when it remains under the authority of the same executive branch that is seeking a particular outcome?

For decades, that question remained largely academic.

Today, with more than 3.2 million pending cases, increasing detention litigation, rising federal court intervention, and growing public scrutiny, the question has become central to the future of America’s immigration system.

The $900 Million Question: Why America’s Immigration Court Backlog Keeps Growing Despite More Judges, More Funding, and More Technology

Key Takeaways

• Immigration court backlogs have surpassed 3.2 million pending cases, the largest in American history.
• Congress has repeatedly increased funding for immigration courts.
• EOIR now employs nearly 700 immigration judges, more than ever before.
• Despite record hiring and record spending, delays continue to worsen.
• Structural inefficiencies may be as important as staffing shortages.
• Many experts argue that independent Article I immigration courts would improve efficiency, consistency, and public confidence.
• Other democracies use more independent immigration adjudication systems than the United States.

The Biggest Question Nobody Wants to Ask

For years, politicians from both parties have proposed the same solution to immigration court delays:

Hire more judges.

Congress appropriates more money.

The Department of Justice hires more immigration judges.

New courtrooms are opened.

Technology systems are upgraded.

Remote hearings are expanded.

Case management systems are modernized.

Yet the backlog continues growing.

Why?

If adding judges and increasing budgets were sufficient, the crisis should already be improving.

Instead, the opposite has happened.

As of 2026, immigration courts face approximately 3.2 million pending cases, an increase that would have seemed unimaginable only a decade ago. According to the latest data from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), the backlog remains at historic levels despite unprecedented hiring efforts.

This raises an uncomfortable possibility:

The problem may not simply be a lack of resources. The problem may be the structure itself.

The Numbers Are Staggering

To appreciate the scale of the crisis, consider the following:

Immigration Court Backlog

• Approximately 3.27 million pending cases
• More than 2.3 million pending asylum-related matters
• Hundreds of thousands of appeals pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals
• Hearing dates often scheduled years into the future

Source:

https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html

For many immigrants, the defining feature of the immigration court system is no longer adjudication.

It is delay.

What Does a 3.2 Million Case Backlog Actually Mean?

The human consequences are often overlooked.

For immigrants:

• Families remain in limbo for years.
• Witnesses disappear.
• Evidence becomes stale.
• Children age out of eligibility categories.
• Employers lose workers.
• Psychological stress becomes chronic.

For asylum seekers:

• Protection claims remain unresolved for years.
• Family reunification is delayed.
• Long-term planning becomes impossible.

For employers:

• Workforce uncertainty increases.
• Recruitment strategies become more complicated.
• Compliance costs rise.

For taxpayers:

• Every delay carries a cost.

The Cost of Delay

Delay is expensive.

Every postponed hearing requires:

• courtroom staff;
• judicial resources;
• clerical support;
• interpreters;
• attorneys;
• detention resources in some cases;
• electronic record maintenance.

Cases often cycle through:

• continuances;
• transfers;
• appeals;
• remands;
• motions to reopen;
• administrative processing.

Each additional step consumes resources.

The longer a case remains pending, the more expensive it becomes.

Congress Has Already Increased Funding

One common misconception is that immigration courts are underfunded simply because Congress refuses to spend money.

The reality is more complicated.

EOIR’s budget has increased dramatically over the past decade.

For FY 2027, the Department of Justice requested approximately $899 million for EOIR operations.

Government source:

https://www.justice.gov/jmd/media/1433166/dl

Congress has repeatedly funded:

• new immigration judges;
• new support staff;
• expanded facilities;
• electronic filing systems;
• remote hearing technology;
• case management modernization.

Yet the backlog continues growing.

The obvious question becomes:

Why isn’t the investment producing proportional results?

The Judge Hiring Strategy Has Reached Its Limits

For years, the primary solution has been hiring.

• More judges.
• More support staff.
• More courtrooms.
• More docket capacity.

EOIR recently announced that the immigration judge corps has expanded to nearly 700 judges, the largest number in agency history.

Government source:

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eoir-announces-77-immigration-judges-and-5-temporary-immigration-judges

On paper, that sounds impressive.

But mathematics tells a different story.

Even if every judge handled thousands of cases annually, the system continues receiving new filings at extraordinary rates.

The result resembles a treadmill that continually accelerates.

No matter how fast judges work, the incoming volume often exceeds capacity.

In 2025, nearly 100 immigration judges were fired nationwide. Immigration judges lack statutory protection against removal without cause.

The Productivity Trap

This has led to one of the most controversial developments in immigration court history:

performance metrics and case completion quotas.

The Department of Justice has periodically evaluated immigration judges using numerical productivity measures.

Supporters argue:

• taxpayers deserve efficiency;
• delays are unacceptable;
• performance should be measurable.

Critics argue:

• judges are not factory workers;
• speed should not outweigh fairness;
• due process requires individualized review.

The problem becomes especially acute when courts are expected simultaneously to:

• move cases quickly;
• ensure fairness;
• handle increasingly complex legal issues;
• comply with changing policies.

The competing goals often conflict.

Why Independent Courts Tend to Function Differently

Supporters of reform frequently point to an important distinction:

Most courts are designed primarily to adjudicate.

Immigration courts are often expected to both adjudicate and implement executive branch priorities.

Those goals are not always compatible.

The DOJ uses enforcement goals to direct resources and case management in immigration courts.

When administrations prioritize rapid removals, court resources may be redirected.

When administrations prioritize backlog reduction, judges may face pressure to increase productivity.

When administrations change, priorities often change as well.

Independent courts typically experience far less policy volatility.

There are over 700 immigration judges in the U.S. immigration courts. Immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney General. Immigration judges do not have life tenure like federal judges.

Immigration judges lack the authority to hold attorneys in contempt, limiting their power.

EOIR imposed rigid case completion goals on immigration judges. Immigrants must find and pay for their own lawyers. Over 3.5 million cases are pending in immigration courts. Judges can issue oral decisions at the end of removal hearings.

Compare the U.S. Tax Court

One frequently proposed model is the U.S. Tax Court.

Official website:

https://www.ustaxcourt.gov

The Tax Court is an Article I court.

It is independent from the Internal Revenue Service.

This distinction is important.

The IRS collects taxes.

The Tax Court resolves disputes involving the IRS.

The adjudicator is institutionally separate from the enforcement agency.

Most Americans would find that arrangement logical.

Imagine if IRS employees served as judges in tax disputes.

Public confidence would collapse.

Yet immigration adjudication continues operating under a structure that many observers believe creates a similar appearance problem.

Bankruptcy Courts Provide Another Example

Bankruptcy courts offer another useful comparison.

Official information:

https://www.uscourts.gov

Bankruptcy judges do not work for creditors.

They do not work for debtors.

Their legitimacy depends on neutrality.

Businesses and individuals trust the process because the adjudicator is independent.

The same principle applies to immigration cases.

Whether the outcome favors the government or the immigrant, public confidence depends heavily on confidence in the decision-maker.

How Other Democracies Handle Immigration Adjudication

The United States is increasingly an outlier.

Canada

Canada relies on the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), an administrative tribunal that operates independently from immigration enforcement authorities.

Official source:

https://irb.gc.ca

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom utilizes independent tribunal systems that are separate from immigration enforcement agencies.

Australia

Australia provides independent merits review through specialized tribunals separate from frontline immigration enforcement functions.

Official source:

https://www.art.gov.au

Although no system is perfect, many democracies have moved toward greater adjudicative independence rather than greater executive control.

The Real Courts, Rule of Law Act

For years, lawmakers have proposed creating an independent Article I immigration court.

One of the best-known proposals is the Real Courts, Rule of Law Act.

Congressional information:

https://lofgren.house.gov/media/press-releases/lofgren-leads-bill-create-independent-immigration-court-system

Supporters argue such a system would:

• reduce political influence;
• improve consistency;
• strengthen due process;
• increase public confidence;
• improve administrative efficiency.

Opponents argue:

• transition costs could be substantial;
• additional bureaucracy might emerge;
• independence alone would not eliminate backlogs.

The debate continues.

Would Independent Courts Actually Reduce Delays?

This is the critical question.

The answer is probably:

Not immediately.

An independent court system would not magically eliminate millions of pending cases.

However, supporters argue it could improve several long-term structural problems:

Greater Consistency

Less policy whiplash between administrations.

Better Resource Planning

Multi-year budgeting independent of political cycles.

Reduced Litigation

More consistent decisions could produce fewer appeals and federal court challenges.

Increased Public Confidence

Parties may be more willing to accept outcomes from genuinely independent adjudicators.

Improved Judicial Retention

Experienced judges may be more likely to remain in a system perceived as independent.

The Hidden Cost: Federal Court Intervention

Another overlooked expense is federal litigation.

As immigration courts face criticism and constitutional challenges increase, federal courts increasingly become involved.

Federal judges now regularly hear:

• habeas corpus petitions;
• detention challenges;
• due process claims;
• APA lawsuits;
• constitutional challenges to immigration policies.

When administrative adjudication loses credibility, litigants often seek relief elsewhere.

The result is more litigation, more costs, and additional delays.

The Economic Argument for Reform

Supporters of independent immigration courts increasingly frame reform as an economic issue rather than merely a civil rights issue.

The argument is straightforward:

A court system handling millions of cases should be designed for:

• stability;
• predictability;
• efficiency;
• public confidence.

Repeated policy reversals, shifting priorities, and structural uncertainty create inefficiencies that taxpayers ultimately fund.

The issue is no longer simply fairness.

It is governance.

The Bottom Line

The immigration court crisis is no longer a temporary backlog problem.

It is a structural challenge affecting:

• immigrants;
• families;
• employers;
• taxpayers;
• federal courts;
• the rule of law itself.

Congress has increased funding.

DOJ has hired more judges.

Technology has improved.

Yet the backlog continues to grow.

At some point, policymakers must confront a difficult question:

If decades of additional funding, staffing, and administrative reform have not solved the problem, is the problem the structure itself?

That question lies at the center of the growing movement to transform immigration courts from executive branch agencies into truly independent courts.

When Courts and Enforcement Become Too Close: How Executive Branch Control Shapes Immigration Adjudication

Key Takeaways

• Immigration courts remain under the supervision of the Department of Justice.
• The Attorney General retains authority to personally review and reverse immigration cases.
• Immigration judges and BIA members operate within the same executive branch responsible for immigration enforcement.
• Numerous immigration court policies have shifted dramatically when presidential administrations changed.
• Federal judges often review and sometimes reject immigration policies advanced by executive agencies.
• The issue is not whether individual immigration judges are biased.
• The issue is whether the structure creates an appearance—and sometimes a reality—of institutional alignment with enforcement priorities.

The Debate Is Not About Individual Judges

Before discussing controversial examples, an important distinction must be made.

The argument for independent immigration courts is not that immigration judges are dishonest.

Nor is it that immigration judges deliberately ignore the law.

Most immigration judges are experienced attorneys and public servants attempting to manage overwhelming caseloads under difficult circumstances.

The problem is structural.

The concern is that no court system deciding matters of such extraordinary consequence should remain under the authority of the same executive branch that is pursuing removal.

In other words:

The issue is not individual bias.

The issue is institutional design.

What Independence Looks Like

Consider a federal district judge.

Federal judges are appointed by presidents.

Some are appointed by Republicans.

Others are appointed by Democrats.

Yet after confirmation, they become independent.

A judge appointed by President Trump does not work for President Trump.

A judge appointed by President Biden did not work for President Biden.

Federal judges regularly issue decisions rejecting the legal arguments of the administrations that appointed them.

Indeed, one of the defining features of constitutional democracy is that judges can rule against the government without fear of professional consequences.

Their duty is to the Constitution and the law.

Not to political leadership.

That independence creates public confidence.

People may disagree with decisions.

But they generally trust the legitimacy of the process.

Immigration Judges Occupy a Different Position

Immigration judges do not enjoy those same institutional protections.

They are employees of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).

EOIR is part of the Department of Justice.

Official source:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir

Their appellate court—the Board of Immigration Appeals—is also part of DOJ.

The Attorney General oversees both.

This creates a system unlike virtually every other major adjudicative system in the United States.

The prosecutor and the court ultimately operate within the same executive branch hierarchy.

Attorney General Certification: A Power Unlike Any Other

Perhaps the clearest example of executive influence is the Attorney General’s certification authority.

The Attorney General may take a pending immigration case away from the Board of Immigration Appeals and personally issue a binding nationwide precedent.

Government source:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir

No equivalent authority exists in federal district court.

No Attorney General can:

• reverse a federal district judge;
• rewrite federal appellate precedent;
• overrule the Supreme Court.

Yet immigration courts operate under a system where executive branch officials may directly shape nationwide legal standards.

This authority has been exercised by Attorneys General from both political parties.

The concern is not partisan.

The concern is structural.

The BIA and the Shifting Direction of Immigration Law

Another recurring criticism involves the Board of Immigration Appeals.

The BIA serves as the highest administrative immigration tribunal.

Its decisions frequently determine:

• detention rights;
• asylum eligibility;
• motions to reopen;
• cancellation of removal;
• adjustment of status;
• discretionary relief.

Over the years, immigration practitioners have observed significant swings in BIA jurisprudence as administrations changed.

Some decisions expanded relief.

Others restricted relief.

Some increased procedural protections.

Others narrowed them.

The issue is not whether every decision was correct or incorrect.

The issue is that the appellate tribunal remains embedded within the same executive branch that establishes immigration enforcement priorities.

Critics argue that appellate adjudication should be insulated from those pressures.

The Administrative Closure Wars

Perhaps no issue better illustrates political volatility than administrative closure.

Administrative closure allows immigration judges to temporarily remove cases from active dockets.

Different administrations have taken dramatically different positions regarding whether judges possess this authority.

The result has been years of litigation, conflicting precedents, reversals, and policy changes.

Cases have moved from:

• permitted;
• prohibited;
• partially restored;
• fully restored;
• challenged again.

The underlying statutes remained largely unchanged.

The interpretation changed.

This illustrates a recurring theme throughout immigration adjudication:

Political transitions frequently produce legal instability.

Independent courts typically experience far less volatility.

The Growing Divide Between Immigration Courts and Federal Courts

Over the last decade, a pattern has emerged.

Administrative tribunals often interpret immigration statutes through the lens of executive branch priorities.

Federal judges frequently approach the same issues through constitutional analysis.

As a result, federal courts increasingly serve as a corrective mechanism.

The growing volume of:

• habeas litigation;
• Administrative Procedure Act lawsuits;
• constitutional challenges;
• mandamus actions;

suggests that many litigants no longer view immigration courts as the final safeguard for due process concerns.

Instead, they increasingly seek review from truly independent judges.

That trend should concern policymakers regardless of political ideology.

Why Public Confidence Matters

Courts ultimately depend upon legitimacy.

People comply with decisions not merely because they must.

They comply because they believe the process was fair. Due process requires a fair hearing before a neutral decision-maker.

Public confidence requires more than fairness.

It requires the appearance of fairness.

Even perfectly fair judges may struggle to maintain public confidence when they operate inside the same executive branch responsible for prosecution and enforcement.

This is why so many scholars, judges, practitioners, and organizations continue advocating for structural reform.

The issue is not individual integrity.

The issue is institutional independence.

The Central Question

If immigration courts were being designed today from scratch, would Congress intentionally place them inside the Department of Justice?

Would Congress create a system where:

• judges work for the executive branch;
• appellate judges work for the executive branch;
• prosecutors work for the executive branch;
• the Attorney General may establish binding precedent?

Or would Congress create an independent court system similar to:

• the U.S. Tax Court;
• the Court of Federal Claims;
• bankruptcy courts;
• other specialized adjudicative bodies?

That question increasingly drives the modern reform movement.

And it leads directly to the debate over Article I immigration courts.

The Solution? What an Independent Article I Immigration Court Could Look Like

Key Takeaways

• Many legal scholars, former immigration judges, bar associations, and lawmakers support replacing EOIR with an independent Article I immigration court.
• Article I courts already exist in the United States, including the U.S. Tax Court.
• An independent immigration court would remove immigration judges and the BIA from Department of Justice control.
• Supporters argue reform would increase consistency, due process, public confidence, and long-term efficiency.
• Critics argue independence alone would not eliminate backlogs and could create transition costs.
• The debate is no longer whether immigration courts face a crisis.
• The debate is whether structural reform is necessary to solve it.

If We Were Designing the System Today, Would We Build It This Way?

Imagine Congress was creating an immigration court system from scratch in 2026.

Lawmakers know:

• immigration cases affect millions of people;
• deportation can separate families;
• asylum decisions may determine life or death;
• lawful permanent residents may lose their status;
• employers depend upon predictable outcomes;
• taxpayers spend nearly $1 billion annually on immigration courts.

Would Congress deliberately place those courts inside the Department of Justice?

Would Congress create a system where:

• judges work for the executive branch;
• appellate judges work for the executive branch;
• prosecutors work for the executive branch;
• the Attorney General may rewrite precedent?

Most reform advocates believe the answer is no.

They argue that the current structure exists largely because of historical accident rather than deliberate constitutional design.

What Is an Article I Court?

Many Americans are familiar with Article III courts.

Those include:

• U.S. District Courts
• U.S. Courts of Appeals
• The U.S. Supreme Court

Less well known are Article I courts.

These are specialized federal courts created by Congress.

Examples include:

• U.S. Tax Court
• U.S. Court of Federal Claims
• U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

Official Tax Court website:

https://www.ustaxcourt.gov

These courts perform judicial functions while remaining institutionally independent from the agencies whose decisions they review.

That distinction is crucial.

Why the Tax Court Is the Most Common Comparison

The U.S. Tax Court is often cited as the best model for immigration court reform.

Consider the comparison.

Current Immigration System

DHS enforces immigration laws.

DOJ operates immigration courts.

DOJ operates the BIA.

The Attorney General oversees the system.

Tax System

IRS collects taxes.

IRS audits taxpayers.

IRS assesses liabilities.

The U.S. Tax Court independently reviews disputes.

The IRS does not control the court.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot rewrite Tax Court precedent.

The Secretary of the Treasury cannot personally reverse Tax Court decisions.

Most Americans would consider that arrangement fair.

Supporters of immigration court reform ask a simple question:

Why should tax disputes receive more judicial independence than deportation cases?

The Core Reform Proposal

The most common proposal would remove EOIR from the Department of Justice and create an independent Article I immigration judiciary.

Under most reform plans:

Immigration Judges Would Become Independent Adjudicators

Judges would no longer be DOJ employees.

The BIA Would Become an Independent Appellate Court

Appellate review would remain available, but outside DOJ control.

The Attorney General Would Lose Certification Authority

Political appointees would no longer issue binding immigration court precedent.

Courts Would Control Their Own Administration

Budgeting, staffing, and judicial administration would be managed independently.

Long-Term Planning Would Improve

Court operations would no longer shift dramatically whenever administrations change.

The Real Courts, Rule of Law Act

One of the most prominent reform proposals is the Real Courts, Rule of Law Act.

Congressional information:

https://lofgren.house.gov/media/press-releases/lofgren-leads-bill-create-independent-immigration-court-system

The proposal would:

• establish an Article I immigration court;
• remove adjudication from DOJ;
• create a trial division, an appellate division, and an administrative division;
• provide greater judicial protections;
• enhance separation between adjudication and enforcement.

This design resembles other specialized courts built around a clear internal structure.

Supporters include:

• former immigration judges;
• immigration law scholars;
• AILA;
• numerous legal organizations.

Why Former Immigration Judges Support Reform

Perhaps the strongest support for independence comes from those who worked inside the system.

Many retired immigration judges have concluded that structural reform is necessary, and support also comes from leaders in the immigration bar, including a former chair of a relevant immigration-law body and the Federal Bar Association.

Their concerns frequently include:

• political interference;
• inconsistent precedent;
• shifting enforcement priorities;
• docket manipulation;
• public confidence;
• due process concerns.

Notably, these critiques come from individuals who served within the immigration court system itself.

This is not merely an outside criticism.

It is increasingly an internal one.

Could Independence Reduce Backlogs?

Critics sometimes respond:

“Even if courts became independent, 3.2 million cases would still exist.”

That is true.

Independence would not magically eliminate the backlog.

But supporters argue that independence could improve several factors that contribute to inefficiency.

Greater Stability

One of the biggest challenges facing immigration courts is policy volatility.

Administrative priorities often change every four years.

Sometimes faster.

Independent courts could provide:

• more predictable procedures;
• greater continuity;
• less litigation over changing policies.

Reduced Administrative Whiplash

Over the last decade, immigration courts have experienced repeated reversals involving:

• administrative closure;
• continuances;
• asylum standards;
• prosecutorial discretion;
• docket management.

Each reversal creates:

• retraining costs;
• new litigation;
• procedural confusion.

Independent courts could reduce this cycle.

Better Judicial Retention

Immigration judges often face:

• extraordinary caseloads;
• changing directives;
• political scrutiny.

A more independent judiciary might improve retention and recruitment.

Experienced judges are valuable.

When judges leave, institutional knowledge leaves with them.

More Public Confidence

Courts depend upon legitimacy.

People are more likely to accept unfavorable outcomes when they believe the decision-maker was independent.

This principle applies equally to:

• immigrants;
• employers;
• taxpayers;
• the government.

Confidence in outcomes is often as important as the outcomes themselves.

International Comparisons

The United States is increasingly unusual among advanced democracies.

Canada

The Immigration and Refugee Board operates independently from immigration enforcement authorities.

Official source:

https://irb.gc.ca

United Kingdom

Immigration appeals are heard by independent tribunals.

Official source:

https://www.gov.uk/courts-tribunals

Australia

Independent review bodies hear immigration-related appeals.

Official source:

https://www.art.gov.au

No system is perfect.

However, many countries have moved toward greater separation between enforcement and adjudication.

The United States largely has not.

The Constitutional Argument

Many scholars believe immigration adjudication increasingly resembles judicial work rather than administrative processing.

Immigration judges decide:

• facts;
• credibility;
• statutory interpretation;
• constitutional claims;
• procedural rights.

They conduct trials.

They hear testimony.

They issue written decisions.

They adjudicate disputes between parties.

Those functions look increasingly judicial.

The more judicial the role becomes, the stronger the argument for judicial independence.

The Counterarguments

Not everyone supports reform.

Several arguments are commonly raised.

Independence Won’t Solve Everything

True.

More judges and resources would still be needed.

Transition Costs Could Be Significant

Creating a new court system would require substantial planning and funding.

Immigration Is Inherently Executive

Some scholars argue immigration control is fundamentally an executive function and should remain within executive agencies.

Congress May Lack Political Consensus

Structural reform requires legislation.

Legislation requires political agreement.

That remains difficult.

These objections deserve serious consideration.

The debate is not one-sided.

Why the Reform Movement Continues Growing

Despite these objections, support for independent immigration courts continues expanding.

The reason is simple:

The current system faces criticism from nearly every direction.

Advocates criticize it.

Former judges criticize it.

Scholars criticize it.

Federal judges increasingly scrutinize it.

Even many government officials acknowledge that the backlog has reached unsustainable levels.

When a system generates criticism from multiple perspectives, structural reform becomes increasingly difficult to avoid.

The Bigger Question

The debate ultimately extends beyond immigration.

It concerns the nature of courts themselves.

What makes a court legitimate?

What makes people trust outcomes?

What creates confidence in the rule of law?

For centuries, democracies have answered those questions similarly:

Courts should be independent from those seeking a particular outcome.

The more closely adjudicators become connected to prosecutors, political leaders, or enforcement agencies, the more difficult it becomes to maintain public confidence.

That principle applies whether the issue is taxes, veterans’ benefits, bankruptcy, criminal law—or immigration.

The Future of Immigration Courts

The question is no longer whether immigration courts face a crisis.

The backlog exceeds 3.2 million cases.

The budget approaches $900 million annually.

Federal litigation continues growing.

Political disputes remain intense.

The real question is whether Congress will eventually conclude that incremental reforms are no longer sufficient.

If that day comes, the most likely solution will be an independent Article I immigration court.

The debate has already begun.

The only uncertainty is when it will finally produce action.

The Future of Immigration Courts: Will America Finally Create an Independent Immigration Judiciary?

Executive Summary

America’s immigration court system stands at a crossroads.

• The backlog exceeds 3.2 million pending cases.
• Federal courts are increasingly intervening.
• Detention litigation is exploding.
• Congress continues appropriating additional funds.
• New immigration judges continue being hired.
• Yet confidence in the system continues to erode.

The central question facing policymakers is no longer whether immigration courts face a crisis.

The question is whether the current structure can realistically solve that crisis.

Or whether the United States will eventually be forced to create an independent immigration judiciary.

The Immigration Court System Is Reaching a Breaking Point

The current system faces simultaneous pressures from every direction.

Pressure From Case Volume

The immigration court backlog exceeds 3 million pending cases.

Official TRAC Data:

https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html

Every month, new cases enter the system.

Even record hiring has not reversed the trend.

Pressure From Federal Courts

Federal judges increasingly hear:

• habeas corpus petitions;
• detention challenges;
• constitutional claims;
• Administrative Procedure Act lawsuits;
• mandamus actions;
• due process challenges.

Pressure From Congress

Congress faces growing demands for:

• more judges;
• more funding;
• faster adjudication;
• stronger due process protections;
• greater consistency.

Pressure From the Public

Immigrants, employers, universities, families, advocacy organizations, and state governments increasingly question whether the current structure remains sustainable.

What Happens If Nothing Changes?

The most likely scenario is continued growth of the existing system.

Under this model:

• Congress appropriates additional funds;
• DOJ hires more judges;
• technology improves;
• court capacity expands.

This is essentially the approach used for the past twenty years.

The challenge is that backlog growth has generally outpaced reform efforts.

Without structural changes, the immigration courts may continue experiencing:

• longer delays;
• larger dockets;
• greater federal court intervention;
• increased administrative costs.

Why Federal Judges Are Becoming the Real Immigration Court of Last Resort

One of the most significant developments in modern immigration law has occurred outside EOIR.

It has occurred in federal district courts.

Across the country, independent federal judges increasingly review:

• detention decisions;
• bond hearing denials;
• expedited removal practices;
• due process violations;
• constitutional challenges.

Many underlying disputes begin in immigration court hearings, where the government is represented by a DHS attorney.

Many of these cases arise because litigants believe the administrative system has failed to provide meaningful review.

This trend should concern policymakers regardless of political ideology.

A well-functioning administrative court system should reduce—not increase—the need for federal judicial intervention.

Yet the opposite appears to be occurring.

The Irony of the Current System

Supporters of executive control often argue that immigration courts must remain within the executive branch because immigration enforcement is an executive function.

Yet the practical result has been growing judicial involvement.

Federal district judges now routinely decide issues involving:

• detention;
• bond eligibility;
• constitutional protections;
• removal procedures;
• agency authority.

In other words:

The less confidence litigants have in administrative adjudication, the more they seek review from independent judges.

The current structure may actually be producing more federal litigation, not less.

What an Article I Immigration Court Might Look Like

If Congress eventually acts, the most likely model is an Article I immigration court.

The closest existing example is the U.S. Tax Court.

Official source:

https://www.ustaxcourt.gov

A future immigration judiciary could include:

Independent Trial Courts

Current immigration judges would become judges of an independent court.

Independent Appellate Division

The BIA would be replaced or restructured as a true appellate tribunal.

Merit-Based Judicial Selection

Judicial appointments could be insulated from political changes.

Independent Budgeting

The court could receive direct congressional appropriations rather than operating through DOJ.

Greater Stability

Legal standards would become less vulnerable to rapid political shifts.

Is Reform Politically Realistic?

The answer is increasingly yes.

Not immediately.

But eventually.

Why?

Because nearly every major stakeholder now recognizes the problem.

Different groups may disagree about solutions.

But they increasingly agree that the current system faces serious challenges.

Support for reform now comes from:

• former immigration judges;
• immigration scholars;
• bar associations;
• members of Congress;
• advocacy organizations;
• many practitioners.

The debate is gradually shifting from:

“Is there a problem?”

to

“What should replace the current system?”

That is often how major institutional reforms begin.

The Most Likely Timeline: 2026–2030

Scenario One: Incremental Reform

Probability: High

Congress continues funding increases.

Additional judges are hired.

Technology improves.

The current structure remains intact.

This is the most likely short-term outcome.

Scenario Two: Partial Independence

Probability: Moderate

Congress creates greater separation between DOJ leadership and immigration adjudication.

Attorney General powers become more limited.

Judicial protections increase.

This could serve as a transition model

Scenario Three: Full Article I Immigration Court

Probability: Moderate to Long-Term

Congress eventually creates an independent immigration judiciary.

The transition would likely occur gradually over several years.

This outcome appears increasingly plausible if backlog growth and federal litigation continue.

Scenario Four: Status Quo Failure

Probability: Significant

Backlogs continue growing.

Federal courts become increasingly involved.

Public confidence continues declining.

Congress eventually acts only after a larger institutional crisis develops.

Historically, many major court reforms occur only after systems become unsustainable.

Why This Debate Matters to Every American

Some view immigration court reform as an issue affecting only immigrants.

That is mistaken.

The issue affects:

Taxpayers

Nearly $900 million annually is spent operating immigration courts.

Employers

Workforce planning depends upon predictable adjudication.

Families

Delays affect marriages, parents, children, and relatives.

Communities

Local economies are impacted by prolonged uncertainty.

Courts

Federal judges increasingly absorb disputes that administrative courts cannot fully resolve.

Democracy

The legitimacy of legal institutions depends upon public confidence.

The Founders Understood This Problem

The framers of the Constitution recognized a fundamental truth:

Courts cannot function effectively if they are perceived as extensions of political power.

That insight led to:

• separation of powers;
• judicial independence;
• lifetime tenure for federal judges.

The purpose was not to protect judges.

The purpose was to protect the public.

Immigration courts currently operate outside many of those safeguards.

The debate over Article I courts is ultimately an effort to apply those same principles to one of the most consequential areas of modern law.

The Bottom Line

Immigration courts decide questions that profoundly affect human lives.

They determine:

• who may remain in the United States;
• who may be deported;
• who receives asylum;
• who remains with family;
• who loses lawful status.

Yet unlike most courts in America, they remain housed within the executive branch.

That structure was largely inherited from history.

It was not carefully designed to address modern realities.

Today, America faces:

• a backlog exceeding 3.2 million cases;
• escalating costs;
• increasing federal court intervention;
• growing concerns about consistency and independence.

The debate over independent immigration courts is no longer theoretical.

It is rapidly becoming one of the most important institutional reform discussions in American law.

Whether reform arrives in five years or twenty, the trend is unmistakable, especially because the vast majority of these cases are still decided within a system controlled by the executive branch:

The larger immigration adjudication becomes, the harder it becomes to justify a court system that remains under the control of the same executive branch responsible for enforcement.

The future of immigration courts may ultimately depend upon a simple principle that has guided democracies for centuries:

Courts work best when they are truly independent.

Frequently Asked Questions

Are immigration courts part of the federal judiciary?

No. Immigration courts are part of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the U.S. Department of Justice.

Official Source:

https://www.justice.gov/eoir

---

Are immigration judges federal judges?

Immigration judges are federal employees and adjudicators, but they are not Article III federal judges.

---

Who controls immigration courts?

Immigration courts are overseen by EOIR, which operates under the Department of Justice and ultimately under the authority of the Attorney General.

---

Can the Attorney General change immigration law?

The Attorney General cannot rewrite statutes enacted by Congress but can issue binding precedent decisions that immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals generally must follow. Immigration judge decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, in some cases, to federal courts.

---

What is an Article I immigration court?

An Article I immigration court would be an independent court established by Congress and separated from the Department of Justice.

---

Why do some people want independent immigration courts?

Supporters argue that independent courts would improve:

• judicial independence;
• due process;
• consistency;
• public confidence;
• long-term efficiency.

---

How many immigration court cases are pending?

According to TRAC, the backlog exceeds 3.2 million cases.

https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html

---

Would independent courts eliminate the backlog?

No.

However, supporters believe independent courts could improve efficiency, consistency, and long-term case management.

---

Has Congress proposed independent immigration courts?

Yes.

Several proposals, including versions of the Real Courts, Rule of Law Act, have sought to establish Article I immigration courts.

---

Why does judicial independence matter?

Judicial independence helps ensure that decisions are based on law and facts rather than political pressures or enforcement priorities.

Resource Center

Government Resources

• EOIR: https://www.justice.gov/eoir
• Immigration Court Practice Manual: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/reference-materials/ic
• Board of Immigration Appeals: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
• Department of Justice Budget Documents: https://www.justice.gov/jmd

Congressional Resources

• Real Courts Rule of Law Act:
  https://lofgren.house.gov/media/press-releases/lofgren-leads-bill-create-independent-immigration-court-system

Data Resources

• TRAC Immigration Court Backlog:
  https://tracreports.org/immigration/quickfacts/eoir.html

Professional Organizations

• AILA Independent Court Resources:
  https://www.aila.org/library/policy-brief-america-needs-independent-fair-and-efficient-immigration-courts
• American Bar Association Immigration Court Reform:
  https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration

HLG Immigration Court & Immigration Judge Resource Center

• Cleveland Immigration Court 2026: Complete Survival Guide
• Immigration Court in Cleveland, Ohio
• Deep Dive Into Trump’s War Against Immigration Courts
• Deportation Judges 2025: Immigration Court Crackdown and Due Process
• Trump Purge Immigration Judges and Their Polarizing Impact
• Trump Fires Immigration Judges Amid Growing Court Backlog
• Protecting Immigrants from Expedited Removal and Immigration Court Arrests
• 2025 BIA Bond Rulings and No-Bond Immigration Detention
• Implications of Vacatur of Yajure Hurtado
• Bond After Hurtado and Maldonado Bautista: 2026 Guide for ICE Detainees in Ohio
• Why Cleveland IJs Are Still Denying Bond After Bautista
• The Colossal Impact of the Bautista ICE Detention Ruling 2026
• ICE Detention in Ohio: How to File Habeas
• 10 Steps to Navigate ICE Detention: Youngstown ICE Detention Lawyer
• Immigration Bond in Ohio: What to Do in the First 72 Hours After an ICE Arrest

Need Help With Immigration Court, Detention, Bond, Habeas Corpus, or Deportation Defense?

The immigration court system is changing rapidly.

New detention policies, expanding expedited removal authority, shifting BIA precedent, increasing ICE enforcement, and evolving federal court decisions—often reshaped by shifts in the administration’s agenda—have created unprecedented uncertainty for immigrants, families, employers, students, asylum seekers, and lawful permanent residents. Recent court fights have also shown how the trump administration used aggressive executive immigration measures that drew legal challenges. In many cases, officials justify prioritization decisions by citing homeland security concerns.

Whether you are:

• facing removal proceedings in immigration court;
• detained by ICE and seeking release;
• denied a bond hearing;
• challenging prolonged immigration detention;
• considering a federal habeas corpus petition;
• appealing an immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals;
• responding to a motion to terminate proceedings;
• concerned about expedited removal;
• seeking asylum or cancellation of removal;
• defending a green card, visa, or immigration benefit;
• preparing for a hearing before an immigration judge;

experienced legal representation can make a critical difference.

For more than 30 years, Richard Herman and the attorneys at Herman Legal Group have represented immigrants nationwide in immigration court proceedings, detention matters, bond hearings, BIA appeals, federal court litigation, habeas corpus actions, and complex deportation defense cases.

Our team closely monitors:

• immigration court developments;
• BIA precedent decisions;
• federal habeas corpus litigation;
• ICE detention policies;
• expedited removal practices;
• immigration judge procedures;
• federal court challenges affecting immigrants across the United States.

If you or a family member is facing immigration court, detention, or deportation issues, do not wait until options become limited.

Schedule a Consultation

Learn more about HLG’s immigration court and deportation defense services at Removal Defense, Immigration Detention, and Immigration Appeals.

To discuss your situation with Richard Herman or an experienced Herman Legal Group attorney, call 1-800-808-4013 or schedule a consultation online at Herman Legal Group. The firm also helps clients coordinate filings, scheduling, and hearing logistics with court personnel.

When your future in the United States is at stake, experienced guidance matters.